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Views on Monetary Policy
HE IDEAL MONETARY POLICY requires a
credible and predictable commitment to main-
tain the long-term purchasing power of a
currency. The performance of central banks,
which have traditionally been entrusted with
monetary policymaking, is far from this ideal
simply because a clear mandate for price-level
stability—zero inflation—is absent. In practice,
central banks serve as instruments that govern-
ments use to pursue multiple objectives that
they believe serve their interests. Therefore
central banks pursue monetary policies that at
best have only a fragile commitment to price
stability. Governments are currently pursuing
policy coordination or monetary union strate-
gies that are little more than attempts to implement
a regime of monetary protectionism, in the
global economy. The future of monetary policy
rests on the continuing struggle between politi-
cians seeking policies that serve their short-term
agendas and global financial markets that limit
the actions of an individual central bank.
In my remarks I discuss why central banks
have been established, their bias toward infla-
tion and the importance of independence and
accountability to their effectiveness. 1 also argue
that zero inflation should be the dominant
objective of a central bank and that current
efforts to coordinate monetary policies are
likely to conflict with that objective.
WHY CENTRAL BANKS?
What is the justification for a central bank?
Can some configuration of private institutions in
a so-called free-banking environment perform
the functions of a government-sponsored mone-
tary authority? Are central banks necessary?
In his 1959 Millar Lectures at Fordham
University, Milton Friedman provided a classic
statement of the economic rationale for central
banks.’ Friedman’s argument appealed funda-
mentally to the costs inherent in a pure commodity-
standard system, for example, a gold-standard
system. These costs arise both from pure resource
costs and perhaps more significantly from sub-
stantial short-run price variability resulting from
inertia in the adjustment of commodity-money
supply to changes in demand. The inefficiencies
these costs represent are a significant disadvan-
tage of commodity-money exchange systems.
As a consequence there is a natural tendency,
borne out by history, for pure commodity standards
to be superseded by fiat money. But particular
aspects of fiat money systems—such as fraudulent
‘These lectures were subsequently published as A Program
for Monetary Stability.
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banking practices, natural monopoly characteristics
and tendencies for localized banking failures to
spread to the financial systemas awhole—resulted
in the active participation of government. We have
come to know this active participation as cen-
tral banking.
Rationales for establishing central banks have
not gone unchallenged, not even by Friedman.’
Disruptions in payments can be costly, but so
are the instabilities and inefficiencies caused by
the lack of an effective anchor for the price
level in fiat money systems. Moreover, ‘theoretical
discoveries in finance and monetary economics,
closer attention to the lessons of lustorical bank-
ing arrangements and advances in infot-mation
and financial technologies have contributed to a
healthy skepticism about the supeiiority of central
banks and government regulation to alternative
market arrangements. For example, some of the
financial-backstop functions performed by central
banks and banking regulators may have weakened
private market incentives to control and protect
against risk.’
Stilt, those who argue for alternative monetary
structures must at least recognize that their
case rests on untested propositions. Yes, it would
be wrong to accept unthinkingly our current
central banking system as the best alternative
for performing the monetary functions of advanced
economies, but it would also be wiong to claim
that the current central banking system does
not reflect society’s choice of an institutional
arrangement to perform those functions.
It is not sufficient to argue that market-
oriented alternatives to oui current central
banking systems functioned better in other
times and places, for example, in 18th-century
Scotland.4 This begs the question of why such a
system did not prove to be sustainable. Nor is it
sufficient to argue that this system would have
prevailed if not for government intervention
arid interference. This line of debate fails to
consider whether a political equilibrium that
would support a market-oriented system in an
advanced economy exists anywhere.
It is premature to claim that some hypothetical
monetary system can or should dominate institu-
tional arrangements that have already evolved
from extended political and economic experience.
I believe that the prudent first course is to con-
sider the advantages of improving the perform-
ance of central banks. The benefits of a properly
managed fiat currency are considerable, and the
issue is or should be how to provide the central
bank with a proper charter to ensure policy
action that generates price-level stability in the
long term. If such efforts fail, market alterna-
tives should be sought.
Because I am most familiar with the Federal
Reserve, let me use it as an example. Before the
creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, the
country prospered without a central batik.
Broadly speaking, the impetus for creating the
Federal Reserve was a series of banking panics
that led to contractions in money and credit
that in turn caused serious disruptions in eco-
nomic activity. The nation sought to improve its
banking system by establishing a means for
providing an elastic money in the context of a
monetary standard based on full convertibility
to gold. The gold link was severely weakened
by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.
The Federal Reserve was the result of a com-
promise between those who would have kept
the banking system entirely private and those
who wanted government to assume a prominent
role in a rapidly growing economy. Other nations
have grappled with the same problems and created
similar institutions. Today many republics of
the former Soviet Union and several eastern Euro-
pean nations are facing these same issues. We
now have a world monetary system in which
governments, through central banks, monopolize
the supply and management of inconvertible
fiat monies.
The displacement of the commodity standard
that prevailed at the time the Federal Reserve
was founded has exposed problems not other-
wise envisioned in 1913. For example, the price
level has no anchor except fot that provided by
the resolve of Federal Reserve policymakers.
The quadrupling of prices since 1950 dramati-
cally demonstrates the failure of Federal Reserve
policymakeis to provide such an anchor for the
monetary exchange system. Fed policymakers’
commitment to price stability is neither as explicit
nor as strong as necessary for the successful
management of a fiat currency. The gradual
demise of our convertible monetary standard
has brought us to a point that requires a basic
‘See Friedman and Schwartz (1986)
‘See Goodhart (1988).
4For a discussion of the free banking era in Great Britain,
see White (1984).
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change to the framework within which the
Federal Reserve functions if the benefits of a
fiat currency are to be achieved without large
offsetting costs.
The evolution of the global monetary system
reflects a common, though unstated, acknowledg-
ment that the benefits of a fiat monetary standard
are substantial. Wise administration of that
standard requires a central bank in some capacity.
In this context, the essential issue is this: How can
nations achieve the benefits of a fiat money
standard and simultaneously consti-ain the exercise
of that power to the service of the public good?
Put another way: How can a nation prevent its
central bank from debasing the monetary standard
it is charged to protect?
INFLATIONARY BIAS OF CENTRAL
BANKS
The answer to these questions seems to elude us.
Witness the universal debasement of currencies
by central banks since the loss of a commodity
standard as a price-level anchor. To find the
answer, we must review central bank charters
and the incentives provided to those who con-
trol monetary printing presses. public-choice
economists have focused on this issue and
developed a rich literature; however, I feel they
fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the
secular bias toward inflation among central
banks (with different charters and varying
degrees of independence from political influence).
Moreover, this approach fails to explain why in
earlier periods governments did not consistently
exploit the opportunities to inflate by realigning
their currencies against gold or dropping their
convertibility -
Another explanation br persistent inflation
that iìas some appeal is policy mistakes, or inap-
propriate tat-gets or operating procedures of
central banks. This explanation also leaves some
unanswered questions. Why aren’t policy mistakes
symmetrical? That is, why don’t they cause defia-
tions as well as inflations, leaving the average
pt-ice level unchanged over time? Perhaps policy
mistakes are biased toward inflation because of
the operating procedures employed, such as
interest rate targeting. Yet the Bundesbank, which
uses monetary aggregate targets, produces a rising
price level. The Bank of Japan uses interest rate
targets and has generated a similar increase in
its price level during the past two decades. If a
central batik is dedicated to price-level stability
over time, the choice of targets or operating
procedures probably only influences the variabil-
ity of inflation rates around a zero mean. In short,
a central bank that truly wants to achieve price-
level stability can do it with any number of
operating techniques, as long as they control
money growth over time.
Perhaps a simple, and less elegant, explanation
for persistent inflation is that central bankers are
suffering from a Keynesian hangover. Centi-al
hankers, politicians and the public are merely
reflecting the prevailing economic dogma that
government has the responsibility and ability to
manage aggregate output and employment, as
well as inflation. I have argued and continue to
believe that a major source of price-level insta-
bility comes from multiple objectives assigned to
central banks—economic growth, employment,
price stability and exchange rates. It is true that
politicians pressure central banks to achieve dif-
ferent objectives at different times. Such politi-
cal pressure can produce inappropriate policy
actions; however, the responsibility for assign-
ing multiple objectives to central banks rests as
much with the economics professions as it does
with politicians. For the last 50 years, many
economists have supported various theories of
business-cycle management, which required that
central banks shift from one objective to another.
Today businessmen, politicians and most econormusts
continue to believe that if the economy is weak,
the central batik should respond regardless of
the cause of the weakness. And so it does.
Some of the current discussions about mone-
tary policy and the Federal Reserve suggest that
the lessons of the 1970s may he fading from
out- memories. Calls for lower interest rates or more
rapid money growth are not at all unusual.
More often than not, those suggestions seem
impelled by desires for growth or desires to off-
set the problems of particular sectors of the
economy. They seem based on the notion that
there is a trade-off between inflation arid output
or between inflation and employment that can
be exploited by the central bank. Some of us
learned from the experience of the 1970s that
such a trade-off does not occur over time.
Instead, higher inflation only added to uncer-
taints’, distorted resource allocation and reduced
economic performance below the maximum sus-
tamable level with price stability.
Members of a central batik policy committee
such as the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) reflect what is believed by the mainstream.
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In January 1990 the National Association of
Business Economists surveyed its members and
asked the following question: Is reducing the
inflation rate to zero over the next five years
the appropriate objective of monetary policy?”
More than 80 percent of the respondents
answered no. Their responses indicate that they
believe the FOMC should trade off inflation for
some other objective, presumably economic
growth At about the same time, the House Sub-
committee on Domestic Monetary Policy sur-
veyed 500 members of the American Economics
Association who list monetary economics as either
their first or second specialty. The unpublished
survey shows that only a slight majority of those
who responded favored zero inflation over the
next five years.
I believe that much of the inflationary bias of
central banks over the past 50 years reflects the
prevailing view that output and employment
fluctuations can be smoothed with monetary
policy. Currently, before each FOMC meeting,
members of the Committee are presented with
the policy views of several prominent economists.
Either explicitly or implicitly, these views invari-
ably present the policy choice in terms of a
Phillips curve trade-off. Staff projections at the
FOMC meeting also imply such a trade-off, as
do the statements by some FOMC members.
Moreover, policy actions, such as a reduction in
the federal funds rate, often follow the release
of employment or output statistics, further rein-
forcing the notion that the F’ederal Reserve can
manage real variables. To the extent that this
explanation of central bank behavior is valid,
inflationary bias will not be eliminated until
there is agreement within the profession on




The problems that emanate ftom multiple,
and often incompatible, objectives are well
known. To conttibute to maximum economic
growth over time, central banks must achieve
price-level stability. Achieving this goal requires
that central banks be free from political
expediencies—that is, that they have independ-
ence within government. Substantial evidence
indicates a link between central-bank independ-
ence and the ability to achieve price stability.
Recent studies show that countries that grant
their central banks the greatest degree of inde-
pendence have had the lowest rates of inflation.8
Even taking into account other sociopolitical
factors that might cause inflationary pressures,
the degree of central-bank independence appears
to have an important effect on a country’s infla-
tion rate.
However, with independence must come
accountability. Even the clearest objectives will
prove elusivewithout accountability; independence
without direct accountability is a dangerous
brew for those who drink it. Great harm has
come from well-intentioned, independent cen-
tral bankers with little or no accountability—
witness the United States in the 1930s. Many
mechanisms exist today to bring accountability
to central banking; for example, the employ-
ment contract of the governor of the central
bank of New Zealand contains a price-stability
requirement.
The objectives, degree of independence, and
accountability of the central bank are substan-
tially determined by its legal structure. For
example, a clear legislative directive to achieve
price-stability goals above all others and the
freedom to pursue price-stability initiatives
would all but eliminate potential conflict with
other objectives. The vexing question of what
extent, if any, a central bank should compromise
the price-stability objective to pursue auxiliary
goals, such as smoothing real output fluctua-
tions or stabilizing exchange rates, should be
resolved and dictated in the legislative charter.
True independence and strict accountability can
be attained only legislatively.
Compared with the central banks of other
countries, the Federal Reserve System has a
better structure to execute monetary policy
effectively; however, the Fed is not as well posi-
tioned as other central banks. The FederalReserve
is charged with multiple objectives that are
often incompatible but that at least include
price stability. It is functionally independent
within government, but it faces intermittent
challenges to its autonomy. Its independence
comes from both its charter and its practice.
lndependence is essentially a delineation
between the responsibilities of Congress and the
executive branch on one side and the monetary
‘See NABE Policy Survey (1990). 6See Alessina (1988) and Banaian (1983).
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authority on the other to limit the motive and
means to debase the value of the nation’s money.
‘~“he~~source of tension between monetary and
fiscal authorities is the central bank’s ability to
create money. Because the creation of fiat money
imposes an implicit tax on money balances, the
monetary authority is one source of government
revenues. For the most part, the long-run viability
of the government’s fiscal operations requires
that its real current debt burden plus the present
value of its expenditures equal the present value
of revenues. Thus ifthe path of debt plus expendi-
tures diverges from the path of explicit tax rev-
enues, fiscal viability requires that the discrepancy
he satisfied by seigniorage from monetary growth.
This scenario is typically referred to as fiscal
dominance over the monetary authority.
The original Federal Reserve charter left
many doors open for the executive branch to
influence monetary policy. These were partially
closed when the Banking Act of 1935 removed
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comp-
troller of Cvrrency from the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System. In addition,
the law established the FOMC, with the seven
governors and five of the Federal Reserve Bank
presidents as voting members, ensuring that
power within the Federal Reserve would be
shared between political appointees and regional
hank presidents. Thus the fire wall that made the
Federal Reserve, and not the executive branch,
responsible for monetary policy objectives was
reinforced. It was strengthened further by the
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, which
served as a clear statement that the Fed would
not he coerced into solving the federal govern-
ment’s debt-management problems. The institu-
tional structure was designed to ensure enough
Fecletal Reserve independence within the govern-
ment to carry outthis mandate without interference.
This independence in principle has held up in
practice. ‘Thedramatic increases in federal deficits
in the early- and mid-1980s prompted fiscal
dominance believers to predict that it would be
impossible to achieve and maintain inflation
rates below the disastrous levels of the decade’s
start. So far, this prediction has not come to
pass. In 1983 the federal budget deficit was 3.8
percent of GNP, a level far above the post-
World War II aver-age and nearly equal to the
postwar peak realized in 1975. In the same
year, inflation measured by the consumer price
index fell to 3.2 percent—a 16-year low. As the
decade proceeded, the deficit relative to GNP
rose, fell, and rose again to its present level
above S percent. The inflation rate was impervi-
ous to these patterns.
Astute observers might question the melevance of
the early- and mid-1980s to the fiscal dominance
proposition, because deficits as they are conven-
tionally measured do not necessarily reflect the
government’s long-run fiscal operations. To name
just a few of the problems, the value of long-
run government net liabilities is inherently
ambiguous, the path of future revenues is un-
certain and the appmopriatemethod of discounting
future tax and expenditure flows is problematic.
Although sympathetic to this view, I am still left
with the strong suspicion that if any period in
recent history was ripe for the emergence of
fiscal dominance, it was the last 10 years.
Indeed, as the decade progressed and the
predictions of the fiscal-dominance theory failed
to materialize, more sophisticated variants of
the relationship between fiscal and monetary
policy began to find their way into economic
research. The fiscal authority’s reign over the
subservient monetary authority was replaced by
a more subtle and complicated institutional
structure, a world in which fiscal and monetary
authorities played a game of chicken, the out-
come of which left both parties less than fully
satisfied.~Although deficits may be detrimental
to economic performance, the ability of the
Federal Reserve to resist monetizing debt has
protected the economy from even worse conse-
quences. The Federal Reserve’s decision to resist
monetizing the federal debt resulted in loiver infla-
tion and contributed to fiscal reforms that started
with the Gramm-Rudrnan-Hoilings legislation.
In my view the Federal Reserve has sufficient
independence to achieve pm-ice stability. The core-
problerri, however, is that the Federal Reserve is
not accountable for that objective. Without
accountability, the policy process will be neither
credible nor predictable. The more credible the
commitment to the policy goal, the fewer wrong
decisions will be made by the markets. The more
predictable the policy reaction to unforeseen
economic events, the more limited will be the
market reaction to those events. Credibility and
ptedictahility can substantially lower the costs
‘See Sargent (1985).
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of achieving and maintaining a stable price level.
Yet with the disintegration of the monetary
aggregates as intermediate policy guides, discre-
tionary monetary policy actions may seem espe-
cially hard to predict because policy objectives and
accountability for’ them are unclear. The exist-
ing policy process, with its focus on short-term
economic or financial developments does not
provide credibility.
How can we change the process to reinforce
the cm-edibility of a consistent goal? I think the
most secure way would be to give the FOMC a
legislative mandate to meet a consistent, attainable
and unchanging economic goal. Passage of
House Joint Resolution 409, introduced by Rep-
resentative Stephen Neal, would pmovide that
crucial reinforcement. The Nealresolution simply
directs the Federal Reserve to make price stabil-
ity the primary goal of monetary policy and to
achieve that goal within fiveyear-s. History gives us
little basis for expecting price stability or’ even a
stable rate of inflation because the FOMC has
had no mandate to produce that result. Giving
the FOMC that mandate and knowing that the
FOMC intended to stabilize the inflation rate at
zero, would provide one gigantic piece of policy
informatiomi to any rational decision-maker- in
any dollar-denominated market. The Federal
Reserve would remain independent, and it
would retain complete discretion about how to
carry out policy. The only change would be that
Congress would provide more direction about
the basic policy objective, and the Federal
Reserve would be accountable for achieving it.
True accountability would also require an
incentive or enforcement mechanism for achiev-
ing the objective.
The FOMC can deliver lower inflation without
a legislative mandate. Of that you should have
no doubt! Inflation is a monetary phenomenon,
and the FOMC is the sole custodian of the quan-
tity of money in the United States. If a zero-
inflation mandate were in effect, short-term
deviations from zero inflation might occur, but
one way or another the FOMC could provide a
stable price environment. As niany scholars
have urged, the FOMC might impose accounta-
bility on itself by tying policy actions to some
intermediate target variable by an agreed-on
formula that would ensure price stability. These
days, the most popular candidates for an inter-
mediate policy target seem to he nominal GDP
and M2, either of which is thought capable of
producing reasonable price stability. Another
approach would be for the Committee to specify
achieving the ultimate policy goal as the rule,
while using discretion in choosing actions to
achieve the goal.
Of course having today’s FOMC impose account-
ability on itself (by adopting an explicit rule
tying an instrument to a goal) is not a foolproof
way to achieve an official policy goal. Credibility
would have to be earned through predictable
actions consistent with the goal. To adopt an
explicit rule, at least a majority of today’s FOMC
members must not only agree on an overriding
macroeconomic goal, but also renounce some
discretion to pursue other goals. Moreover,
tomorrow’s FOMC could decide to change the
goal and hence the rule. In the current policy
regime, today’s policy choice can in no way
bind tomorrow’s. Unless directed by society
through specific mandate, tomorrow’s FOMC
always has the discretion to change the goal.
And with shifting goals there is no accountabil-
ity. I believe that the lack of accountability for a
dominant policy goal of price stability is the
major cause of the inflationary bias in the U.S.
economy since World War II.
Although the specifics of the Federal Reserve
charter differfrom those of othercentral banks, the
problems of comiflicting objectives and the lack
of secure independence and explicit accountabil-
ity are common to all central banks in varying
degrees. Experience around the world and
through time repeatedly demonstrates that cen-
tial banks require independence from day-to-
day political life to perform their price-stability
role. If we could create legal and cultural condi-
tions that truly fix a central batik with account-
ability for anchoring the price level, the structure
of the central bank itself would become less
important. Those circumstances would be a joy




I stmomigly believe for three reasons that the
dominant objective of monetary policymakers
should be price stability. First, in the long run,
a central hank can control the price level of
goods and services denominated in its own cur-
iemicy, hut it cannot control the growth of out-
put (potential or actual). Second, a credible
commitment to a price-stability objective enables
a central bank to piomote economic efficiency
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and growth (potential and actual). Third, price.
level stability, popularly called zero inflation, is
superior- to inflation-rate stability.
Among economists, support for’ the fir-st reason
is nearly universal. There is also widespread
agreement on the second point. A central bank
that pur’sues price stability promotes economic
efficiency and growth. I would venture further
to say that experience shows that central banks
that have sought to enhance economic growth
directly have failed miserably at providing sta-
ble price levels and ironically have undercut eco-
nomic growth in the process. The lastreason—that
rio inflation is prefer~ihleto stable, non-zero
inflation—is most contentious, particularly when
people attempt to compare the transitional costs
of achieving price stability with the costs of
stabilizing the inflation rate at the status quo.
The argument that the cost of pursuing a zero-
inflation target would outweigh the benefit of
reaching that target has two dimensions. The first
is that the benefit of achieving zero inflation
would he small. The second deals with the costs
of moving from a 4 percent trend rate of infla-
tion to zero inflation. This is the transition-cost
argument, which essentially says that even if zero
is the place to be, getting there is riot worth the
ride. I believe that the benefits of zero inflatiomi
are great and that the transition costs can he
reduced if the Federal Reserve commits to an
explicit plan for achieving zero inflation.
The interaction between inflation and our cur-
rent tax system, especially as it applies to
income generated by capital, represents one of
the mnore significant channels through which
non-zero inflation can exact economic costs.’
This channel of distortiomi is often not taken
seriously because people think that its effects
are minimal or that it would be easy to index
the tax system. Correcting the tax code is a
good idea of course, but until that happens,
what possible excuse is there for not letting the
monetary authorities do what is necessary to
improve 5OciLil welfare?
It is clear that the horrendous U.S. inflation-
an’ experiences of the 1970s and early 1980s
created the impetus for the limited inflation
indexation of the current tax system; however,
the job is far from complete. Capital gains, cor-
porate depreciation and interest expenses, and
personal interest income remain untouched by
efforts to index the tax system for inflation.
Even the bracket indexation implemented by
recent tax reform does not fully protect tax-
payers from bracket creep, or nonlegislated
increases in marginal tax rates created by infla-
tion. Complete indexation of the tax code, how-
ever desirable it may be, will be extremely
difficult to achieve. Will another inflationary
experience like that of the 1970s be required
to induce further progress on tax indexation?
I fail to understand why some feel that these
inflation-tax interactions are a significant drag
on the economy, yet argue that only Congress
should be concerned with the problem. The prob-
1cm exists because of the interactions between
inflation amid a tax systetn based in current dol-
lars. Therefore it seems that the responsibility
for minimizing these costs lies as much with
the monetary authorities as with Congress.
Doesn’t it make more sense for monetary
authorities to try to correct the inflation part of
the problem rather than simply hoping that
Congress will implement changes that it may he
unable or unwilling to pursue? We speak about
the costs of achieving zero inflation, but what
about the costs of fully indexing the tax system?
Surely they would he significant.
Another area of concern is the role of uncertainty
as a source of inflation costs. How important
at-c the distortions that arise from pt-ice—level
uncertainty? There is a class of models—the
market-clearing, imperfect-information paradigm
associated with Robert Lucas and others—in
which inflation uncertainty harms the economy
by distorting the period-to-period relative price
signals that facilitate the efficient allocation of
scarce resources.’ Despite the pervasive intellec-
tual influence exerted by the I ucas framework
to this day, the empirical evidence accumulated
since the development of the paradigm in the
early 1970s has not been entirely supportive.
This point is not lost on critics, who think that
the lack of eyidence on short-term distortions
should persuade us that inflation uncertainty is
simply not that important to social welfare.
Surel the relative-price/aggregate-price confu-
sion stressed by the Lucas-type models isa spe-
cial type of uncertainty. ‘I’he failure to find
significant effects from uncertaint that is
resolved within a few quarters tells us next to
nothing about the type of long-run uncertainty
with which the zero-inflation position has
always been fundamentally concerned.
‘See Altig and Carlstrom (1990). ‘See Lucas (1972).
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Indeed, it seems likel that the uncertainty
occurring over exLended time horizons is pre-
cisely what is most affected by the average
inflation rate.’’ This is one reason why I favor a
price-level tam’get. An imiflation-rate tam-get ena-
hles the price level to drift without bound, and
with no enforcement mechanism to ensure that
inflation mistakes will be corrected, the long-
run variance of the price level is infinite. When
people have reason to believe that this standard
will erode over time, they invest miujmiemous
resources to protect themselves. Those who
have nominal debt outstanding will drag their
feet in paying it hack, whereas cm-editors will
invest in ways to accelerate the collection of
funds. ‘The private gains to self-protection are
clear, as ar-c the social costs.
Recent experience is the best testimony to the
real resource cost of inflation. During the
I9705, people could see that inflation acceler-
ated each year. The~’guessed, reasonably at the
time, that financial assets had limited value in
protecting their wealth from inflation. Conse-
quently, farmland, commercial and residential
property, and precious metals became much
more expensive as people sought to shelter their
wealth. Not only was time spent seeking these
investmnemits, which was socially wasteful, hut
also the resource misallocation itself resulted in
a great waste of land, labor and capital that
society is still paving for’ today.
It is difficult to comprehend how elficiemit
p1ann~m~g within the public and private sector-s
could not be inhibited liv this type of long-run
uncertainty. Furthermore, the intuition that long-
run inflation uncertainty is costl\’ has empirical
suppor’t. In cross-country compar-isons, economic
growth is negatively retated to the variability of
inflation. One finds that the case for reducing
price level uncertainty is far more compelling
than a cursory analysis might indicate.
In evaluating the costs of attaining zero infla-
tion, economists almost always use morlels in
which markets do riot clear’ or do not clear
without cost. Cone is the market-clearing,
flexible-price, r’ationat-expectations model. In its
place is a model with pm’ice conti-acts that make
the tm’ansition to zero inflation extremely costly.
‘I’he source of the friction is usually riot entirely
explicit, hut the implication is Ihat we must
assume some frictions. These frictions, coupled
with the inability of markets to clear, mnake end-
ing inflation appear as costly as it does.
Isn’t it sensible to assume that the implicit sources
of frictions that make lowering the inflation rate
costly would also contr’ibute to making inflation
costl in and of itself? For instance, a variety of
explicit and implicit nominal contr’acts alm’eady
exist, and a transition to zero inflation could alter
the real values of payments from those that
were originally intended. But surely the entire
institutional apparatus that generates these con-
tracts must involve resource costs that are posi-
tively related to the average i-ate of inflation.
One should not compare the costs of achieving
zero inflation in non-market-clearing models,
where such costs are high, to the benefits of
being at zero inflation in frictionless, continu-
ously clearing models, whet-c the bemiefits are
low. tf we use a model with frictions to meas-
ure the cost of getting to zero inflation, then
we should also use such a model to examine the
benefits of being there. This is one reason I am
skeptical of so many’ cost/benefit estimates of
reducing inflation.
I am also skeptical about tramisition-cost estimates
that do not account for the possibility that a
price-stability objective will be r’egarded as
credible by the public. Ecomiomic theory and
reasonable model simulations persuade me to
believe that with credible precommitnient, a
central hank cami greatly minimize private-sector
planning errors during the transition pem’iod.
I think that much of the disagreement among
economists on the size of transition costs cen-
ters on the ability of a central bank to commit
itself credibly to achieving its objective. Until
I see some hard evidence to dissuade mile, I plan
to continue my advocacy of price stability as the
overriding objective of eemitr’al banks.
It still puzzles mne that volumes of research have
been publisbed on central bank operating pr’oce-
dures arid management of monetary aggregates,
yet relatively little m’esear’ch has been published
on the value of a credible precor~imnitmnentto a
price-stability objective. Mv intuition tells me
that the latter is far more important than the
former in terms of economic welfare. Of course,
credihility depends on policy information avail-
“See Ball and Cecchetti (1990).
“See Grier and Tutlock (1989) and Lebow, Roberts and
Stockton (1990)
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able to market participants so that they can
monitor pm-ogress toward the objective.
One major benefit of imposing an explicit inten-
tion on monetan’ policy is that policy actiomis in the
money market would become far less momentous
than they are now. Currently, detecting a change
in the federal funds rate target from the pat-
tern of open market opem’ations is crucial because
it provides markets with one of the few clues as
to what monetary policy the Federal Reserve is
~nwsuing. Canvassing the positions of individual
FOMC members is a way of predicting futum’e
polic. If policy intent were explicit and credi-
ble, however, finding the clues in open market
opem-ations would have less significance.
1 see the greatest payoff in more inforniation
about policy intentions. An explicit FOMC com-
mitrmment to pr-ice stability would allow markets
to shift resources fromn watching the Federal
Reserve to watching the economy for produc-
tive investment opportunities - Focusing on the
intent of policy contrasts markedly with conven-
tional concerns for more certainty about the
current degree of reserve restraint. There are
many ways to reduce uncertainty about the
iriimediate funds-rate implications of policy, just
as there are many time schedules by which the
FOI’vIC directive might he released. More certainty
about the immediate policy implications of the
federal funds rate i-night make Fed-watching a
bit easier, but it would riot dlo much to help
identify policy intentions hevond short horizons.
Releasing Fed directives eam’l~’might provide a
slightly hr-ighter glimmer of policy intentions,
but only for a slightly longer policy horizon.
We do not need better’ information about the
latest directive; we need better- information
about the process through which all future
directives will be crafted—that is, policy imiten-
tions. Nothing would prot’ide more insight than
a clearly stated goal
MONETARY POLICY AND
MONETARY PROTECTIONISM
Let me turn now to the effects of interria-
tional policy coordination on the pmmrsuit of zero
inflation.12 Exchange-r’ate regimnes and attempts
at nionetam’y union are currently undermining
the price-stability objective. Many actions taken
by central banks are not aimed at price stability,
hut rather are attempts to establish monetary
protectionism. B monetary pm’otectionism, I m’efer
to attempts to alter real exchange rates thm-ough
manipulation of monetary policies and with the
hope of ultimately promoting a balance-of-
paymemits objective. In the case of a deficit
country, monetary protectionists call for an
expansion of money growth (om’ lower miominal
inter~estrates). A monetary expansion, other
tlnngs being equal, will produce a nominal
depreciation. If iridiyiduals are unable to adjust
prices immediately, or if they are slow in per-
ceiving the inflationary aspects of this policy, a
real depreciation will accompany the nominal
depreciation. As most economists realize, how-
ever’, the inflation rate will eventually respond
to the monetary expamision, offsetting the nominal
depreciation and retum-ning the real exchange
rate to its initial position. Nevem’theless, the tenuous,
short-lived relationship between money and the
real exchange rate is seductive enough to con-
vince politicians amid other fine-tuners that
monetary policy can serve mnercantilist designs.
My focus on this issue stems from a firm belief
that central banks can do no better than guar-
antee long-run price stability and that any efforts
to limnit this guarantee ar’e not likely to raise
world welfare. Central banks can juggle a real
exchange rate and inflation target no better
than they can slide back and forth along a stable
Phillips cut-ye. A central bank that attempts to
maintain price~~stability and a nominal exchange
rate tam-get has more policy targets than policy
instruments. At times, these two objectives might
he compatible. For example, in the late t970s,
limiting rapid dollar depr’eciation through inter-
vention could have been conipatible with a con-
ractionary monetary policy to eliminate inflation.
As often as riot, howeyer, these two policy
objectives will be incompatible, amid the central
bank must trade one objective for the other.
tinder such conditions, markets will view nei-
ther’ price stability nor exchange-rate stability as
a credible policy. The knowledge that central
banks will deviate fr’omn a policy of pm-ice stahil-
itt’ to pursue an exchange r’ate objective will
raise uncertainty about real returns and will
distort the allocation of resources across sectors
and through time. The resources dlevoted to
protecting wealth fr-or-n possihle inflation could
l2This section summarizes ideas presented in Hoskings and
Humpage (1990).
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he applied to more productive uses under a pol-
icy of price stability. Moreover, attempts to
maintain nominal exchange rates will not eliminate
exchange rate uncertainty because countries
will inevitably resort to periodic exchange-rate
realignments. Hedging exchange risk will remain
an important aspect of international commerce.
Although monetary protectionism seems most
prevalent under the present system of floating
exchange rates, it does not follow that floating
exchange rates promote its use. Monetary pro-
tectiotnsm can result any time a govem’nnient
accepts nonmarket criteria for exchange rates.
Imi principle, a gold standard or a fixed exchange
rate regime can limit the scope of monetary
protectionism because, if all countries play by
the rules of the game, they link money supplies
closely to the flow of international reserves.
In pr-actice, however, such regimes do not
destroy the political motives for monetary pro-
tectionism, and examnphes of monetary protec-
tionism under fixed exchange rates abound.
By allowing some discretion in the choice of
exchange m~ateadjustments, fixed exchange m’ate
m’eginies often produce a mechanism that weakens
the allocative efficiency of exchange markets
and promotes rnercantilist objectives.
In contrast to the inten’entionist literature,
tyhich presupposes an all-wise govem’nment act-
ing in the public’s best interest, a rich, growing
literature on political economy cham-acterizes
elected officials as seeking to enhance their own
power, prestige and wealth by maximizing their
ability to gain votes. Politicians amid bureaucrats
attempt to extend the scope of their influence
by responding to the demands of the most polit-
ically active constituencies, ‘~ A lioliticil justifica-
tiomi for exchange rate manipulation is that it defers
criticism and postpones niore fundamental actions.
For instance, in 1985 dollar exchange rates
were at their zenith, the U.S. current account
was detem-iorating rapidly and evidence sug-
gested that the t/nited States was becoming a
debtor country for the first time since %‘Vomld
War I. U.S. manufacturers, facing increasingly
stiff competition worldwide, besieged Comigress
for trade legislation. Most impot-tant, analysts
increasingly linked the deterioration in the exter-
nal accounts with the fiscal policies of the Reagami
Administration and Congress. The opportunity
cost of government inaction, measured in terms
of votes lost, seemed to m’ise sharply in the
early i980s.
The U.S. current account deficit reflected
imbalances between savings and investment in
the United States, West Germany and Japan.
Politicians, however, cannot easily redress such
structum-al relationships through fiscal policies
because of strong vested interests in maimitairnng
various tax and expemiditum-e patterns. Umiable to
address these structural problems directly and
quickly, policymakers might resort to exchange-
market imitervention. When coordinated through
the Group of Seven, such intervention offers a
highly visible signal that governments are respond-
ing to the desires of theim constituemicies.’~
Exchange rate policies can also offer temporary
benefits to specific constituencies. When goods
prices are slow to adjust, a nonunal currency
depreciation is equivalent to a temporary,
across-the-board tax on imports and a subsidy
to expor-ts. With the terms of trade temporarily
altered, certain gm-oups mi the traded-goods sectors
can realize benefits fmomn monetary protectionism
similar to those afforded by more traditional
forms of protectionism. Ultimnately, any benefits
from monetary protectionism dissipate with a
high inflation rate and with reduced credibility
of monetary policy. The inflation costs of mone-
tary protectionism, hotvet’em’, are dispersed across
a wider spectrum of individuals and over a
longer time horizon than the benefits. A constit-
uency that m’eceives net benefits from monetary
protectionism (export- and import-competing
firms) can exist. Such a constituency is likely to
he niore politicably cohesive than any coristit-
uency for price stability. Consequently, a policy
that seemns myopic fromn an econonnc perspec-
tive can be politically attractive.
Another seemimigly attractive aspect of mone-
tars’ protectionnsni is that Congress and the
admninistration can justify it in terms of broader
macroeconomnic considerations, such as exchange
rate misalignment or cut-remit account innhalamice,
instead of industry—specific considerations,
such as automobile mmd steel employment.
Consequently, the rent-seeking aspects of mone-
tars’ protectionism am-c less obvious than those
of standard protectionist policies.
“See Quibria (1989)
“The Group of Seven countries are Canada, France, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West
Germany
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Countries interested in establishing exchange
rate targets have a strong incentiye to collude
in their efforts with foreign governments.” In
the case where countries attempt to alter nomi-
nal exchange rates, such collusion provides tacit
for’eign approval of these policies arid linnts the
chances that a foreign goyernment will take
steps to neutralize the exchange policies of
another government. Sometimes such collusion
involves having cartel mnemhem~sdelay policy
negotiations, or exchange rate adjustments,
when indiyidual cartel members face critical
electiomis. Bnetton Woods and the Eumopean
Monetary System (EMS) are examples of collu-
sion that were fairly successful for a period.
‘rhe competitive currency devaluations of the
1930s show what can happen when govern-
ments attempt to fix a price but thieir cartel
breaks down. Coordinated efforts to fix exchange
rates can allow individual countries to influence
the policies of others and to defer some of the
adjustment burdens of maintairnng the peg.
Such mechanisms are found in the EMS and
figure in some proposals for tam’get zones and
for fixed exchange rates. Many support the pro-
posal for a European Central Bank for just this
reason. The alternative is to sacrifice monetary
sovereignty to maintain a flxed exchange rate
and to follow the monetary policy of a major
trading partner.
Under floating exchange rates, a rapid
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate imi
response to such inflationary policies signals the
market’s displeasure and constrains governments.
Through collusion to fix the exchange rate,
however, governments can ternpomarily blunt
the exchange rate reaction to their policies and
reduce the political costs of pursuing inflation-
ary policies. Coordimiation to limit exchange mate
fluctuations is politically attractive because it
eliminates an important, immediate barometer
of the market’s opinion of government policies.
For their part, centnal banks often are willing
participants, viewing exchange rate management
as a legitimate aitn of monetary policy. Exchange
rate mnovememits can impart useful information for
policymaking, and as already noted, exchange rate
targets can sonnetimes he consistent with a
monetary policy of price stability. As often as
not, however, exchange rate policies conflict
with price stability. For example, U.S. put-chases
of foreign curremicies in 1990 seemed inconsis-
tent with a goal of price stability. When these
objectives conflict, the Federal Reserve System is
torn between its independence amid its accounta-
bility to the broad national policy goals set by
Comigress and the Admniniistratiomi. The Federal
Reserve does not wish to appear to the public
as unresponsive to the objectives of Congress
and the administration. Participation also enables
a central bank to imifluence policy formulations
that it is powerless to prevent. Such reasoning
is a certain sign of a central bank unsure of its
objective and insecure about its independence.
In countries with independent central banks,
intervention policies might enable fiscal agents
to extend their influence beyond the foreign
exchange niarket to domestic monetary policy.
Elected officials often seek more stimulative
monetary policies than do cemitral banks, hoping
to lower nominal interest rates and to stimulate
real gi-owth and employment. In choosing a
nominal exchange-rate target, intervening and
encouraging the central batik not to sterilize the
intervention, fiscal agents have a mechanism for
such influence that would usually riot he open.
At timnes, however, such as when the centmal
bank policy conimittee is not in unanimous
agreement, such an influence, marginal though
it may be, could pmove decisive in charting
future monetary policy actions.
INTEGRATED MARKETS AND
POLICY CONSTRAINTS
I have attempted to instill a healthy skepticism
for exchange market manipulation, arguing that
it is a form of monetary protectionism that harms
economic welfare. Monetary protectionism stems
as a near-term palliative from the political inter-
actions between policymakers and constituen-
cies with vested interests in particular market
outcomes. Any international monetary order
willing to accept nonmarket criteria for exchange
rates and failing to bind governments with a
price-stability objective is ripe for monetary pro-
tectionism. To counter the political incentives
toward monetary protectionism, nations should
adopt monetary mandates, such as the Neal
Resolution in the United States, that focus
monetary policy on achieving and maintaining
long-tenm price stability.” ‘rhis would do more
to eliminate exchange market uncertainty and
foster the efficient worldwide use of real
“See Vaubel (1986) “See Hoskins (1990).
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resources than mimi~’ pmogrann to manipulate
miommunal exchange rates.
My comments are riot meant as a blanket con-
demnnation of imiternational policy cooperation.
I strongly support cooperation that mnakes price
stability the dominant objective amid mecogmnzes
market-determnined exchange rates. Only cooper-
ation based on these comiditions seems both
feasible amid credible because it recognizes that
nations want monetary sover~eigntyand will
pursue diflerent economic policy objectives.
Comitr-ar to what some mnight infer, tlns approach
does not preclude European monetar unnfication
in the future, hut it suggests a different appn~oach
than curn-entlv seems to he favored. European
govermimiients are not likely to relinquish national
monetary sovereignty on adoption of a single
market - Consequently, greater exchange rate
flexibility than the EMS currently pmovides
seems necessary to ensure that exchange mates
do miot interfere with the efficient flow of
goods, lahom’ and capital following the removal
of restrictions. The free flow of resources, if it
occurs, will foster a convergemice of policy
pm-efem-enices within Europe as goverrunemits com-
pete for these resources by providing stable
economic and political environments. Govern-
mnents that fail to provide such an environment
will lose resources as markets vote omi policies.
The resulting convergence of nmiomietary and fis-
cal policies will lead to greater exchange i-ate
stability. If in time, governmemital competition
for resources attaimis a convergence of macm-o-
econonnc policy, issues of national policy sover-
eigmity will he muted. Only then will nnonetarv
umiiomi augmenl the efficiency gains of a single
niam-ket. As seems obvious from r-ecent develop-
ments in Europe, efforts to rush monetary
union mu-c effom-ts that put the cart before the
horse amid may well interfere with the progress
toward a single market.
‘to fix exchange rates before a convergence of
policy preferences within the European Economic
Cornmnurnty seenis to ensnmre that interest rates
and pr-ices will hear more of the adjustment
burden. Mom-coven-, judging from the experiemice
of Bretton Woods, fixed exchange rates would seemn
to guarantee speculators periodic exchange i-ate
adjustments and to encourage govermiments to
impede the flow of goods amid capital through
the m-eintroduction of restraints. The dynannics
of achieving monetar-y union are as important
as the goal, and piice stability is a more impor-
tant goal than either.
Scones of new natiomis are busy constructing
central banks to implement mnonetam-y policy.
Using history as a guide, these miew cenitnai
bamiks will try to pursue objectives other than
piice stability, especially since thes’ are being coumi-
seled by cemitral hankers with weak records on
price stability. Short-term political agendas will
likely dominate their policy actions and push
them away fromn the pursuit of price stability.
Yet it seems that there are powerful market
forces that will crimp the effom’ts of central
banks to misnnanage their currencies.
‘I’he integration of world mnarkets, particularly
financial markets, is limiting the degree to which
pohcymnakers are willing to drift away froni
price stability, at least for the major economies.
Twenty years ago the Fedem-al Reserve paid
scant attention to the effect of foreign rnai-kets
on the price of U.S. govem’nnient securities amid
iritemest mates in the United States. Yet when
I participated in FOMC deliberations, we almost
always discussed the effect of a policy’ action on
long-term Treasun-y n~ates,cul-m-ency values or
the shape of the yield curve. The FOMC now
looks at how tt’om-ld financial nnarkets assess the
credibility of its policy actions with respect to
inflation expectations. This process, in effect,
limits the degmee to which the FOMC is willing
to risk inflationary policy actions.
In Ermrope, smaller countries often peg their
curi-encies to the Gem’man mnark, allowing the
Bumideshank to determine their monetary Pol-
icies. The Germami central hank is also limited
by world markets in ternis of the inflation path
it chooses to pursue. I am not so hold as to
aigue that miiarkets will cause central banks to
wither away to agemicies that siniph’ 1)rniip out
monetary growth rates that provide price stability.
It does seem to me, however, that market forces
are stn’engthening the hand of central banks in
fighting political pressures for short-term “quick
fixes” to economic problems. Perhaps even poli-
ticians will learn the limits of goven-nments in
solving economic problems.
If this view proves incorrect, central banks
will face the prospect of mmu~ketparticipants
developing private money to a much greater
degree than exists today. When government
management of paiticulam institutions results in
failume, private-sector- alternatives appear—
witness the privatization trend imi U.S. schools
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and coum’ts. Pemliaps those who eam’n to revisit
the Scottish system of free banking may live to
seeaversion of it replace central banking. If so,
we are likely to pa~’ a heavy price along the way.
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1 Commentary
EE HOSKINS HAS WRITTEN a fine paper
ott ruonetarv policy. I share most of his views
On the role arid duties of central banks. Iloskins
discusses why the conduct of monetary policy
has been entrusted to central banks. He also
examines the conditions that nimmst he satisfied for
central banks to play an effective policy role.
Hoskins’ l)Iilicipal thesis is that cemitral banks are
needed to manage a standard based on fiat miionev.
But a fiat stamidard imposes few constraints on
central banks. If central banks ~ue pemmnilled to
issue fiat mnomwv, there is always the m-isk that
they will abuse their powers. Consequenth’,
under a fiat standam-d it is necessary to ensum-e
that central banks act in the public interest.
Why rIo central banks frequemith’ harm the pub-
lic interest by debasing the currency? Hoskins
discusses several possible reasons. lIe dismisses
the answei-s offered by public-choice economists
and also rejects the notion that unsatisfactory
performamic of centi-al b uiks is due to the pursuit
of inappropriate targets om- operating proce-
dures. Instead, lie main tainis that ‘‘cemitmal bank-
ers are suffem’ing fm’om a Kevmesian hangover-.’’
Fm-equenth’ they do not dit-ect monetary policy
solely at price stability’ but attempt to prmrsue
multiple objectives that often conflict. Phan~’
cemitral bankers attempt to achieve at least two
goals—to keep prices stable and to sniooth cycli-
cal fluctuations in output and emnplovmnent . ‘too
often, iloskins maintains, central bankers also
tr to manipulate the exchange rate with a view
to strengthening the comnpetitive position of
domnestic industry. Of course they do not pur-
sue rnul Iiple objectives because of a character
defect. ‘l’liev mnerel i’eflect prevailing opinions
held by politicians, bankers, economnistsand
othem- members of the general lJLll)lic.
In Iloskins’ \‘ie\\’, the performance of central
banks could he much improved if they were
granted independence fronn govem-nmnemits and
given a single objective—price stability. ‘the cell-
tral banks—thonmgb independent—would not lie
allowed IC) choose policy objectives but would
he given a cIcai’ legislative mandate to achieve
and main lain pm-ice stability. Moreover, they
would he ac-countable to the public for theim
policy actiomi s.
I am largely sympathetic to Iloskins’ sugges-
tions. An imidependent central bank with a clear
mandate to pursue l)lic(~stability’ is likely’ to
perform better than an imistitution attenipting to
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respond to diverse and conflicting political pres-
sures. I also agree with Hoskins that the social
value of a credible price-stability objective is
often underestimated, whereas the costs of
eradicating inflation are overstated.
Thus I support Hoskins’ call for committing
central banks to a price-stability objective. In
my view, however, the story does not end here.
A clear price-stability mandate by itself is not
enough to improve the performance of central
banks. Even if we agree that the objective of
monetary policy should be price stability, we still
have to address a second question: How should
central banks achieve and maintain a stable
price level?
Hoskins plays down the problems of designing
operational policy rules consistent with the
price-stability mandate. Yet as practitioners of
monetary policy know, the translation of such a
mandate into specific policy rules is far from
trivial. Switzerland offers a good case in point.
I argue that the Swiss National Bank (SNB) pos-
sesses a clear mandate to achieve and maintain
price stability even though Swiss law does not
precisely define the objectives of monetary pol-
icy. This mandate, albeit informal, restson a
remarkable consensus among the Swiss public
about the objectives of monetary policy.
The SNB’s informal mandate explains why the
inflation rate in Switzerland has tended to be
low by international standards. Since the begin-
ning of 1975—when Switzerland shifted to
money stock targeting—inflation in Switzerland
has averaged 3.5%. This average, however, still
far exceeds the SNB’s stated inflation target of 0
percent to 1 percent. Consequently, the SNB has
failed to achievepricestabilitydespite the informal
mandate. The SNB’s failure to meet its stated
target results largely from two short episodes of
accelerating inflation. From 1979 to 1981 and
from 1989 to 1991, Swiss inflation temporarily
rose to more than 7 percent and 6 percent,
respectively.
NEED FOR OPERATIONAL RULES
The SNWs failure to achieve price stability did
not reflect a Keynesian hangover. Rather, the
SNB encountered various problems when it
attempted to translate its price-stability mandate
into suitable operational policy rules. The need
for operational rules arises because monetary
policy affects the inflation rate with a long and
frequently variable lag. In Switzerland the time
lagmaybe as much asthreeyears. Thereforemone-
tary policy decisions do notaffect the inflation rate
until long after they are implemented. Because
of the lag, such decisions invariably entail a
great deal of uncertainty. Central banks may
err even if they try to adhere closely to their
mandate. Once they recognize their mistakes, it
is usually too late to take corrective action.
To lower the danger of policy blunders, cen-
tral banks require reliable early warning signals
or leading indicators of inflation. Operational
rules centered on these leading indicators give
central banks a good chance of accomplishing a
goal of achieving and maintaining price stability.
Do centralbanks possess reliable leading indica-
tors of inflation? Thisquestion cannotbe answered
straightforwardly. Monetarists tend to empha-
size the close relationship between money
growth and the inflation rate. They maintain
that the money stock serves as a good leading
indicator of price movements. Therefore central
banks are likely to meet the price-stability objec-
the if they adopt an operational ruleproviding
for steady growth in the money supply.
Most central banks today share the monetarist
view that inflation is due largely to excessive
money growth. Nonetheless, they hesitate to opt
for strategies of steady money growth. The SNB
is no exception. En Switzerland the growth in
both the monetary base and the money stock
Ml tend to lead inflation. Therefore the SNB
focuses attention on these two aggregates and
sets an intermediate target for the Swiss mone-
tary base. It strives to increase the monetary
base at a rate of 1 percent per year. The SNB
views this target as consistent with price stabil-
ity in the medium and long runs.
Although the SNB follows a money-growth rule,
it need not augment the monetary base by 1
percent yearafter year. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, it may temporarily undershoot or
overshoot the 1 percent target. For this reason,
the SNB frames its money-growthrule in termsof
a medium-range target, to be met on the average
of a five-year period. Temporary deviations
from the 1 percent growth path may be
requiredifserious unexpected shockshitthe Swiss
economy. Twokinds ofshocksmayprompt the SNB
to deviate: unexpected shifts in money demand
and other unexpected shocks such as excessive
movements in the exchange rate.
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SHIFTS IN MONEY DEMAND
,\ strategy of steady money growth is effective
only if money demand is stable. In contrast to
many other countries, Switzerland has been
blessed with reasonably stable money-demandpat-
terns. But this does not imply that instabihties
have not occurred. Serious instabilities arose in
the late 1980s as a result of two Financial inno-
vations A new electronic interbank payments sys-
tem and a major overhaul of liquidity requirements,
or minimum reserve requirements, imposed on
banks caused a huge liernianent drop in the
demand for base money. Much of that decline
occurred in the first half of 1988, but stability
was riot restored until about 1990 or 1991.
It is clear that central banks must adjust the
money supply to permanent demand shifts or
long-lasting temporary demand shifts if the\’ are
to keep the price level stable. It is not always
advisable to react quickly to demand shifts,
however. Money demand is subject to frequent
transitory movements that do not call for a
central-hank response. Moreover, demand shifts
are hard to detect. They often become fully
apparent only after considerable time has elapsed.
For these reasons, Meltzer (1987) and McCallum
(1989, Ch. 16) recommend a slow reaction pattern.
They propose mechanical rules that would prompt
central banks to adjust the money supply gradu-
ally to demand shifts. I support Meltzer and
McCallum’s call for a gradual response, hut 1
doubt that central banks should be committed
to a mechanical reaction pattern. The speed of
the response is likely to depend on the nature
of these shifts. For example, if central banks
know in advance that a major shift will occur,
they should adjust the money supply quickly.
Confronted with the demand shift of the late
1980s, the SNB opted for caution. SNB officials
knew that a shift would occur but did not
know how big the shift would be or how fast
base-money demand would fall. As a result of
the SNB’s cautious response, short-term domes-
tic interest rates fell sharply atthe beginningof 1988
but rose again as the SNB gradually lowered the
supply of base money. By summer 1988, short-
term domestic interest rates returned to their
pre-shift levels. Long-term rates, however, did
not budge. Thus market participants correctly
regarded the fall in short-term interest rates as
transitory.
With hindsight, various students of Swiss
monetary policy attribute the most recent surge
in the Swiss inflation rate to the SNB’s cautious
reaction to the demand shift. The SNtI, they
assert, should have acted more aggressively.
The SNB’s cautious response no doubt was
equivalent to a temporary easing of monetary
policy. Nonetheless, it cannot be regarded as the
main cause of the rise in inflation. Ia mnot
aware of any economic theory able to explain
how six months of easy money, which the mar-
ket correctly regarded as transitory, could have
generated three ~‘earsof high inflation. For this
reason, I still maintain that central banks should
react cautiously to shifts in money demand.
OTHER UNEXPECTED SHOCKS
Similar problems arise from other unexpected
shocks that may impinge on the central banks’
anti-inflationar monetary policies. In small
countries like Switzerland, central banks are
frequently compelled to take the real exchange
rate into account when setting monetary policy.
Real exchange i-ate movements often fail to
reflect economic fundamentals. As 1 pointed out
before, Swiss inflation picked up temporarily in
the early 1980s and early 1990s. Although the
SNB attempted to keep the monetary base on a
growth path consistent with medium-run price
stability, the Swiss franc weakened sharply in
real terms during both periods of high inflation;
that is, the depreciation was much larger than
would have been expected on the basis of infla-
tion differentials between Switzerland and other
countries. Therefore the exchange-rate deprecia-
tion reinforced the inflationary pressures in
Switzerland. ‘the SNB reacted to this situation
by tightening monetary policy. As a result, the
monetaiy base fell below the medium-run
growth path. The tightening of the monetary
reins eventually caused the Swiss franc to
appreciate again. In this way, the SNB counter-
acted the inflationary pressures emanating from
the exchange rate.
Lee Hoskins takes a dim view of central-bank
attempts to manipulate the exchange rate. How-
ever, he considers only central-bank efforts to
stimulate domestic employment by means of an
exchange-rate depreciation. Such policies, I agree,
may be inconsistent with the mandate to achieve
and maintain price stability. But we should not
overlook the situations in which exchange-rate
movements undermine central banks’ anti-
inflationary policy stances.
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Nevertheless, Hoskins’ objections to exchange-
rate policy aie often valid. Exchange-rate policy
may or may not he consistent with p1-ice stability.
Swiss experience offers examples of both types
of exchange-rate policy. The SNB did mnore than
try to counteract excessive real depreciations of
the Swiss franc. In 1978 and 1987 it reacted to
an excessive real appreciation by relaxing mone-
tary policy.
Although the real appreciation supported the
fight against inflation, the SNR tried to halt or
even revet-se the upward movement in the
exchange rate. The SNB thought that its efforts
to curb the appreciation of the Swiss franc
~yei~e consistent with its mandate to stabilize the
price level. In 1978 and 1987 inflation was low
and declining. In principle it followed an opera-
tional sti-ategy of gradually lowering the infla-
tion rate. In its view a gradual approach would
minimize the real costs of achieving and main-
taining price stability. Considering its preference
for gradualism, the SNB did not welcome the
real appreciation of the Swiss franc because it
affected the domestic economy in the same way
an unnecessary tightening of monetaj-y policy
would. Therefore the SNB allowed money
growth to rise temporarily above the level con-
sistent with medium-run price stability.
Unfortunately, the SNB’s strategy of adjusting
money growth to the real appreciation of the
Swiss franc turned out to conflict with the
price-stability objective. In both periods inflation
rose again in due course. The two short episodes
of rising inflation are largely explained by the
SNB’s efforts to counteract an excessive real
appreciation of the Swiss franc.
Thus Swiss experience lends at least partial
support to Fioskins’ objections to excliai~ge~,-rate
policy. However, strict compliance with a price-
stability mandate need not imply that central
banks should abstain totally from manipulating
the exchange rate. Even if the SNB tried to rule
out any risks of erring on the side of inflation,
it could not afford to ignore real exchange rate
movements entirely. Instead it had to react
asymmetrically. With an excessive i-cal apprecia-
tion of the Swiss franc, the, SNB would keep the
monetai-t’ base on the medium-run growth path.
Faced with an excessive real depreciation, on
the other hand, it would push the monetary
base below that path. The resulting policy might
he closer to shock therapy than to gradualism.
The i-cal costs of the shock therapy would con-
stitute the price the SNB would have to pay for
playing it safe.
In practice, I doubt that central banks are able
to disregard entirely the real costs of eliminating
inflation. The SNB has repeatedly emphasized
that it cannot stabilize the price level without
accepting a temporary increase in unemployment.
But the Swiss pubhc also expects the SNB to
keep the real costs of its anti-inflationary mone-
tars’ policy as low as possible. Therefore the
SNB, in pi-inciple, must follow a gradualist
approach. We cou]d probably improve our per-
formance if in the future we display greater
r-eluctance to react to excessive real apprecia-
tions of the Swiss franc than we have in the past.
CONCLUSIONS
Let me conclude by emphasizing again that
I agree with the thrust of Floskins’ reasoning.
Monetary policy should be entrusted to indepen-
dent central banks with a clear legislative man-
date to achieve and maintain price stability. But
in my view, independence and a clear mandate
are not sufficient to guarantee a good monetary
policy performance. It is also important that
central banks adopt opem-ational policy rules
consistent with their mandate. Although central
banks should be free to choose appmopmiate
operational rules, they should be commnitted to
spell out explicitly how they intend to fulfill
their mandates. In particular, they should state
how they intend to respond to shifts in money
demand and other unexpected disturbances.
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